Security architecture · v1

Encryption that's already quantum-ready.

Qubble Chat is built on cryptographic primitives that are expected to hold up when a large quantum computer arrives. Text chats use no public-key exchange: no RSA, no ECDH, no Diffie-Hellman. The room key is made in your browser and travels inside the invite link you share. Voice and video calls add a post-quantum ML-KEM-768 key exchange. Nothing here relies on math that Shor's algorithm breaks.

Threat model — what we defend against, and what we don't

✓ A passive observer on the wire

Message text never leaves your browser unencrypted. Our server sees the encrypted messages plus what it needs to deliver them: display names, room IDs, times and sizes. TLS protects the connection; AES-256-GCM protects the messages.

Partly: a compromised server operator

Room keys live after the # in the link, a part your browser never sends to our server, so for guest chats the stored messages cannot be decrypted or forged with anything the server holds. But our server delivers the app's code, so a compromised server could change that code. And if you sign in, your saved-chats list, which holds your links, is kept on our server locked with your password, which our server receives each time you sign in.

✓ A future quantum adversary

Symmetric AES-256-GCM degrades to a 128-bit security level under Grover's algorithm — still well above any feasible attack. Text chats have no public-key exchange for Shor's algorithm to attack, and calls use the post-quantum ML-KEM-768. If you sign in, your saved-chats list is only as safe as the connection that carries your password.

✓ Forward secrecy compromise

Each message uses a fresh key derived from a one-way ratchet. Compromising the current ratchet state cannot decrypt any past message.

What we don't claim

Cryptographic primitives

Symmetric cipherAES-256-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D)
Key derivationHKDF-SHA-256 (RFC 5869)
Forward secrecySymmetric one-way ratchet
Key exchangeText: none (out-of-band via URL fragment) · Calls: ML-KEM-768
IV96-bit cryptographically random, fresh per message
Auth tag128-bit AES-GCM authentication tag
Random sourceWeb Crypto crypto.getRandomValues()
RNGThe browser's cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG)

What an attack looks like (and why it fails)

Scenario: a state actor records every byte of traffic for 20 years

They get a pile of encrypted messages with visible sender names, counters and times. Without the room key — which lives in the URL fragment after a #, never sent to the server — the text cannot be recovered. They cannot brute-force AES-256-GCM with classical hardware (a single-key recovery is ~2256 operations). Under Grover's algorithm on a future quantum computer, that drops to 2128, which is still beyond any feasible attack horizon for the foreseeable future.

Scenario: server operator hands logs to a third party

Our logs and database hold display names, room IDs, times and sizes, and for signed-in accounts the login sessions. They hold no room keys in readable form and no readable messages. The third party can see that communication happened. They cannot see what was said without the room's link.

Scenario: someone intercepts the URL link as you share it

They now have the room key — same as if you'd shared a password. This is why every share link is treated as a credential. Use the in-app share flow over an already-trusted channel (Signal, in-person QR scan, etc.). When you open a link, neither our server nor Cloudflare, which carries our traffic, receives the part after the #.

The ratchet, visualized

INITIAL KEY (HKDF from URL fragment) │ ▼ ┌─────────────┐ message #0 ┌────────────┐ │ chain state │ ───────────────▶ │ message 0 │ AES-GCM(key₀, iv₀, plaintext) │ counter:0 │ └────────────┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ │ HKDF derive next state │ iv₀ = random 96 bits ▼ ▼ ┌─────────────┐ message #1 ┌────────────┐ │ chain state │ ───────────────▶ │ message 1 │ AES-GCM(key₁, iv₁, plaintext) │ counter:1 │ └────────────┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ ▼ ... and so on. Compromising key₁₀ leaks NOTHING about keys 0-9. Forward secrecy holds.

Verify it yourself in the app

Every Qubble Chat message has a ⓘ button that exposes its crypto provenance: the ratchet step number, the IV used, the room key fingerprint, the sender name as our server reports it, and the decrypt time. The persistent Q-E2EE badge in the header pulses every time a message is encrypted or decrypted, so you have a real-time signal that the crypto is alive. No marketing claim — just observable state.

We don't trust security claims that can't be verified. Qubble Chat's security state is exposed in the UI so you don't have to either.

Source & audit invitation