Encryption that's already quantum-ready.
Qubble Chat is built on cryptographic primitives that are expected to hold up when a large quantum computer arrives. Text chats use no public-key exchange: no RSA, no ECDH, no Diffie-Hellman. The room key is made in your browser and travels inside the invite link you share. Voice and video calls add a post-quantum ML-KEM-768 key exchange. Nothing here relies on math that Shor's algorithm breaks.
Threat model — what we defend against, and what we don't
✓ A passive observer on the wire
Message text never leaves your browser unencrypted. Our server sees the encrypted messages plus what it needs to deliver them: display names, room IDs, times and sizes. TLS protects the connection; AES-256-GCM protects the messages.
Partly: a compromised server operator
Room keys live after the # in the link, a part your browser never sends to our server, so for guest chats the stored messages cannot be decrypted or forged with anything the server holds. But our server delivers the app's code, so a compromised server could change that code. And if you sign in, your saved-chats list, which holds your links, is kept on our server locked with your password, which our server receives each time you sign in.
✓ A future quantum adversary
Symmetric AES-256-GCM degrades to a 128-bit security level under Grover's algorithm — still well above any feasible attack. Text chats have no public-key exchange for Shor's algorithm to attack, and calls use the post-quantum ML-KEM-768. If you sign in, your saved-chats list is only as safe as the connection that carries your password.
✓ Forward secrecy compromise
Each message uses a fresh key derived from a one-way ratchet. Compromising the current ratchet state cannot decrypt any past message.
What we don't claim
- scope We don't protect against malware on your device.
- scope We don't protect a key you accidentally share (it's in the URL — treat it like a password).
- scope We don't claim post-quantum signatures (we don't use signatures at all — key authenticity rides on out-of-band channels).
Cryptographic primitives
crypto.getRandomValues()What an attack looks like (and why it fails)
Scenario: a state actor records every byte of traffic for 20 years
They get a pile of encrypted messages with visible sender names, counters
and times. Without the room key — which lives in the URL fragment after a
#, never sent to the server — the text cannot be recovered. They cannot brute-force AES-256-GCM
with classical hardware (a single-key recovery is ~2256
operations). Under Grover's algorithm on a future quantum computer, that
drops to 2128, which is still beyond any
feasible attack horizon for the foreseeable future.
Scenario: server operator hands logs to a third party
Our logs and database hold display names, room IDs, times and sizes, and for signed-in accounts the login sessions. They hold no room keys in readable form and no readable messages. The third party can see that communication happened. They cannot see what was said without the room's link.
Scenario: someone intercepts the URL link as you share it
They now have the room key — same as if you'd shared a password. This is why every share link is treated as a credential. Use the in-app share flow over an already-trusted channel (Signal, in-person QR scan, etc.). When you open a link, neither our server nor Cloudflare, which carries our traffic, receives the part after the #.
The ratchet, visualized
Verify it yourself in the app
Every Qubble Chat message has a ⓘ button that exposes its crypto provenance: the ratchet step number, the IV used, the room key fingerprint, the sender name as our server reports it, and the decrypt time. The persistent Q-E2EE badge in the header pulses every time a message is encrypted or decrypted, so you have a real-time signal that the crypto is alive. No marketing claim — just observable state.
We don't trust security claims that can't be verified. Qubble Chat's security state is exposed in the UI so you don't have to either.
Source & audit invitation
- audit-welcome Responsible disclosure: [email protected]
- public The cryptographic client code runs in your browser — open DevTools and inspect
client.jsdirectly. - public The exact crypto primitives are documented in this page and visible in the per-message verify popover.